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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.
16148

-vsBYRON S. AMBROSE,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals from a jury verdict finding
him guilty of intentionally or knowingly attempting to
cause the death of Gordon Birrell, in violation of Utah
Code Ann.

§§

76-4-101 and 76-5-203 (1953), as amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

Appellant was convicted by a jury of attempted
homicide in the District Court of the Fourth Judicial
District, in and for Utah County, the Honorable George E.
Ballif, Judge, presiding.

Pursuant to the verdict, Judge

Ballif sentenced appellant to imprisonment in the Utah
State
Prison
for
an indeterminate
term
one
to andfifteen
Sponsored by
the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
Funding for digitization provided
by the of
Institute
of Museum
Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

years, an additional term of one year to run consecutively,
pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§

76-3-203 (1)

(1953), as

amended, and an additional term not to exceed five years
also to run consecutively.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment and
sentence entered by the lower court.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Appellant was tried before a jury on September
14 and 15, 1978, on a charge of intentionally or knowingly
attempting to cause the death uf Gordon Birrell, in violation of Utah Code Ann.

§§

76-4-101 and 76-5-203 (1953),

as amended (all statutory references herein are to Utah
Code Ann. unless otherwise indicated).

Gordon Birrell

was at the time of the shooting the husband of appellant's
ex-wife, LaVonda Birrell.

While appellant and Mrs.

Birrell were married they had one child and appellant
adopted Mrs. Birrell's child from a previous marriage
(T.39).

The shooting which was the focus of the charge

in this case was precipitated by disagreement between the
Birrells

and appellant as to appellant's right to visit

his children during the summer of 1978.
On June 28, 1978, Gordon Birrell telephoned
the appellant, who resided in Colorado Springs, Colorado,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

at that time; appellant demanded to see his children
within a short time (T.68).

Mr. and Mrs. Birrell

denied the request based upon the fact that appellant's
visitation rights had been suspended by a judge in Las
Vegas, Nevada, until July 31, 1978 (T.40).

On July 6,

1978, Gordon Birrell again telephoned appellant to
recommend that they resolve the dispute through the
Birrells' attorney.

Appellant became angry and

threatened to kill Gordon Birrell if he was not allowed
to see his children (T.69,189).
On August 2, 1978, appellant traveled from
Colorado Springs to Orem, Utah, to attempt to locate the
Birrells (T.l92).

Before leaving Colorado he purchased

a shotgun and sawed the barrel of the gun off (T.l93).
Appellant located the Birrells' property through the
County Recorder's Office and proceeded to the location
on August 3, 1978

(T.l94-197).

Mr. Birrell had on August 3, 1978, learned

that appellant was in town, and accordingly armed
himself with a pistol strapped to his leg (T.72).
As appellant drove up to Birrells' property, Mr. Birrell
recognized appellant and scrambled to take cover behind
a tree (T.74-75).

Shortly thereafter, Mr. Birrell

was shot by appellant, sustaining wounds in the arm,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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hand and eye (T.76-78).

Appellant admitted at trial that

he (appellant) fired the first shot, but denied that the
shot hit Mr. Birrell (T.201).

Mr. Birrell then returned

appellant's fire by shooting at appellant's truck,
attempting to "mark it" so that he could prove appellant
was there (T.77).
Appellant, after firing five shots at Mr.
Birrell, then departed the scene and turned himself in
to Officer Boyd Olsen of the Orem City Police, who
placed appellant under arrest (T.l02-104).

After being

informed of his Miranda rights while at the Orem City
Police Department, appellant told Officer Dan Howlett
his story (T.l64-174).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PROSECUTION DID NOT BREACH
ANY DUTY TO APPELLANT TO PRESERVE
EVIDENCE.
Appellant contends that he was denied his
right to due process because the prosecution "failed to
preserve" the truck which the appellant drove to and
from the scene of the crime.

After the Orem City Police

took photographs of the truck to be used in evidence, the
truck was released to the registered owner who resided in
Colorado (T.lSl).

Appellant alleges that the police
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should not have released the truck and that such conduct
constitutes destruction or suppression of evidence material
to his guilt or innocence.

Specifically, appellant urges

that "If the accused had the opportunity to test the
evidence, he may have bolstered his credibility before
the jury and received an acquital [sic]."

Appellant's

Brief, p. 6.
Under the standards set by cases cited by
appellant and by other cases, appellant has failed to
allege or prove error sufficient to require reversal of
his conviction.

First, there was no "loss" or "destruction"

of evidence in the case at bar such as was involved in the
cases cited by appellant involving destruction of the
results of breathalyzer tests or loss or destruction of
tape recordings.

See, e.g., People v. Harmes, 560 P.2d

470 (Colo. App. 1976); Scales v. City Court, City of
Mesa, 594 P.2d 97 (Ariz. 1979).

In this case, the truck

was available to appellant and his trial counsel to conduct
independent tests throughout the time that the truck was
impounded by the Orem City Police.

Nevertheless, appellant

made no request to make such tests during that time.

In

addition, even after the truck was released to the true
owners, appellant could have issued a subpoena to obtain
access to the truck to perform tests.

Thus, the evidence
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was not "lost" to the appellant in the sense that a
videotape or recorded tape may be lost by destruction.
For example, in People v. Harmes, 560 P.2d 470 (Colo.
App. 1976), relied upon by appellant, the court
emphasized that destruction of a videotape of the
assault for which the defendant was charged precluded
the defendant from ever demonstrating whether or not
he was guilty.
Finally, the photographs of the truck taken
by the police were made available to appellant's trial
counsel during the trial, and were actually introduced
into evidence as defendant's exhibits (T.l40-142).

The

relevant "evidence" as to the bullet markings on and
damage to the truck was before the jury and appellant
had the opportunity to raise any possible defenses based
upon this evidence.

Respondent submits that the prosecution

here complied with the recommendation of this Court in
State v. Stewart, 544 P.2d 477 (Utah 1975):
We think it advisable that those
charged with investigation and prosecution of crime should retain intact all
records and ether evidence pertaining
to the case until it is finally disposed
of.
544 P.2d 479.

The truck itself could not have been

introduced in evidence at the trial.

However, the

prosecution took photographs of the truck and preserved
and made them available at trial.

The prosecution has
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no affirmative duty to anticipate a defendant's defenses
nor to affirmatively collect and produce evidence which
would be favorable to the defense, especially where
the source of such evidence is equally available to the
defense.

S~ate

v. Totten, 577 P.2d 1165 (Ida. 1978);

State v. Falk, 567 P.2d 235 (Wash.App. 1977).

Thus,

there was in this case no "loss" or "destruction" of the
truck and it follows that the prosecution did not breach
its duty to preserve evidence.
Two cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court have established a general rule regarding suppression
of evidence by the prosecution.
U.S. 83

In Brady v. Maryland, 373

(1963), Brady and his companion, Boblit, were

convicted of first-degree murder and were sentenced to
death.

Brady's counsel specifically requested before

trial that the prosecution disclose any extrajudicial
statements made by Boblit in the possession of the
prosecution.

Although some statements were turned over,

one was not, which contained an admission that Boblit
had done the actual killing.

In Brady's post-conviction

hearing, the Maryland Court of Appeals held this
suppression violated defendant's right to due process
and remanded the case for reconsideration of the punishment,
but not the guilt, of Brady.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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In what has since become known as the "Brady
rule," the United States Supreme Court wrote:
We now hold that the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable
to an accused upon request violates due
process where the evldence is material
either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good or bad faith
of the prosecution.
373 U.S. 83, 87.

Thus, the rule adopted in Brady applies

where the defense made a request for the material
allegedly suppressed before trial.
The Supreme Court further clarified the Brady
rule in United States v. Agurs, 427 u.s. 97 (1976).

In

Agurs, the defendant was convicted of second-degree murder
for killing James Sewell with a knife.

The defendant and

sewell had engaged in intercourse in a motel room, Sewell
then left briefly, and when he returned, apparently found
defendant attempting to steal his money.

A struggle ensued

in which Sewell was stabbed by the defendant with one of
two knives Sewell had been carrying.

At trial, the

defendant alleged that she acted in self-defense and that
Sewell was a violent person.
Defendant's counsel discovered after trial that
Sewell had a prior criminal record, including charges of
carrying a deadly weapon (a knife), and that the prosecution
knew of this record but failed to disclose it to the defense.
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Defendant's motion for a new trial based upon "newly
discovered" evidence was denied by the district court
judge who found that the evidence was not material.
The Court of Appeals reversed, on the basis of the fact
that if the evidence had been disclosed it "might" have
affected the jury verdict.
The United States Supreme Court carefully
distinguished this case from Brady, supra:
In Brady, the request was specific.
It gave the prosecutor notice of exactly
what the defense desired.
Although
there is, of course, no duty to provide
defense counsel with unlimited discovery
of everything known by the prosecutor, if
the subject matter is material, or indeed
if a substantial basis for claiming
materiality exists, it is reasonable to
require the prosecutor to respond either
by furnishing the information or by
submitting the problem to the trial
judge. When the prosecutor receives a
specific and relevant request, the
failure to make any response is seldom,
if ever, excusable.
427 U.S. 97 (emphasis added).

However, in cases in which

the defendant or his counsel either makes no request or
makes a general request for "any exculpatory material,"
the latter of which the Court states is the same as making
no request at all, a different standard applies.
In such cases, the information in the possession
of the prosecution is generally unknown to the defense and
thus the issue becomes when the prosecutor must volunteer
information from his files to the defense.

The Court, in
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answering this question, focuses on the concern that the
failure to disclose is of "sufficient significance to
result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair
trial," 427 U.S. 97, 108.

In rejecting the standard of

"materiality" of the undisclosed evidence adopted
by the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court wrote:
The mere possibility that an
item of undisclosed information might
have helped the defense, or might
have affected the outcome of the trial,
does not establish "materiality" in the
constitutional sense.
427 U.S. 97, 109-110.

Rather:

The proper standard of materiality
must reflect our overriding concern with
the justice of the finding of guilt.
Such a finding is permissible only if
supported by evidence establishing guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.
It necessarily
follows that if the omitted evidence creates
a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise
exist, constitutional error has been
committed.
This means that the omission
must be evaluated in the context of the
entire record.
If there is no reasonable
doubt about guilt or whether or not the
additional evidence is considered, there
is no justification for a new trial.
427 U.S. 97, 112-113.

In a case as the present one where

there is no specific request for disclosure of exculpatory
material, the prosecution has a duty to sua _sponte turn
evidence over to the defense only where the evidence would
have created a reasonable doubt as to guilt which did not
otherwise exist.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Respondent submits that under the Agurs standard,
appellant has not established that had he been able to
introduce evidence as to the truck it would have created
a reasonable doubt as to his guilt which did not otherwise
exist.

Appellant has never contested that he was present

at the scene of the crime, that he fired five shots from
a shotgun at Gordon Birrell, or that he drove a white
Dodge pickup to and from the scene of the crime.

Rather,

he alleges only that if he had performed independent
ballistics tests and introduced such evidence it might
have "bolstered his credibility" before the jury.
Bolstering credibility is not the same as creating an
otherwise absent reasonable doubt as to guilt or
innocence.

It should be noted that appellant has not

challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to authorize
his conviction.

See Taylor v. State, 253 S.E.2d 191, 194

(Ga. 1979).
Further, several courts have recognized that
where evidence is equally available to both the prosecution
and the defense, there can be no "suppression" of such
evidence by the prosecution.

In the case of Anderson v.

Leake, 248 S.E.2d 120 (S.C. 1978), the Supreme Court of
south Carolina, in discussing the issue of prosecutorial
suppression of evidence, wrote:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.
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Although not expressly stated in the
opinion, we think it is implicit that the
Brady rule applies only to favorable evidence
which the prosecution has but which is
unavailable to the defendant. . .
[W]here the evidence is equally
available to the accused, the obligation
on the part of the State to furnish such
evidence to the accused is relieved.
248 S.E.2d 120, 122 (emphasis in original).
The Court in Anderson cited with approval this
Court's holding in Ward v. Turner, 12 Utah 2d 310, 366 P.2d
72 (1961), to the same effect.

Since the truck in the case

at bar was equally available to appellant and to the state,
there was no prosecutorial "suppression" of material
evidence.
POINT II
APPELLANT WAS NOT DENIED HIS
RIGHT TO ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
Appellant alleges that he was denied his
constitutional right to effective assistance of
counsel in the trial of this case.

Specifically,

appellant complains that his counsel's failure to take
adequate steps to preserve the availability of the
truck which appellant drove to the scene of the crime
(see Point I, supra) or to move for dismissal based upon
the "loss" of the truck as evidence constituted ineffective
assistance.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

Appellant correctly identifies the case of
State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203 (Utah 1976), as stating
the standard set by this Court in evaluating a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel:
. the right of the accused to
have counsel is not satisfied by a sham
or pretense of an appearance in the
record by an attorney who manifests no
real concern about the interests of the
accused.
He is entitled to the assistance
of a competent member of the Bar, who
shows a willingness to identify himself
with the interests of the accused and
present such defenses as are available
under the law and consistent with the
ethics of the profession . . .
The record must establish that
counsel was ignorant of the facts or the
law, resulting in withdrawal of a crucial
defense, reducing the trial to a "farce
and a sham."
554 P.2d 202, 204.

This Court further stated in McNicol:

A defendant bears the burden of
establishing the inadequacy or ineffectiveness of counsel, and proof of such must be
a d~~onstrable reality and not a
speculative matter.
554 P.2d 202, 204.

Respondent submits that appellant has

failed to meet this burden in that his allegations do not
establish with any degree of certainty what "crucial
defense" was not presented on the basis of the failure to
preserve the truck as evidence.
As discussed in Point I, supra, appellant's
only contention with respect to the truck is that had he
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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been able to perform independent ballistics tests he "may
have bolstered his credibility before the jury."

This

does not establish the withdrawal of a crucial defense,
but is rather a matter of pure speculation, which does
not support the claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel.
This Court has recognized that counsel's
performance should not be evaluated in the benefit of
hindsight and that the failure to make certain motions
or objections which would have been futile if raised
does not constitute ineffective assistance.

State v.

McNicol, supra; Heinlin v. Smith, 542 Po2d 1081 {Utah
1975).

Since appellant's claim of loss or destruction

of the truck as evidence is groundless {see Point I,
supra), a motion to dismiss on that ground by his trial
counsel would have been uselesso.
In Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 449 P.2d
241 {1969) , this Court recognized that an important
inquiry in deciding upon a claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel is whether better representation might have
had some effect on the result of the trial.

If such a

probable different result does not appear, there is no
prejudicial error warranting reversal of the conviction.
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To the same effect is the statement in the recent case of
State of Utah v. James M. Gray, No. 15550, decided October

2, 1979:
There is the further proposition to
be considered: that even if his counsel
did not perform as skillfully as the
now-convicted defendant might have desired,
his guilt was so clearly evident that even
in the absence of any misjudgment of
counsel we do not believe there is any
reasonable likelihood that there would
have been a different result, wherefore,
there should be no reversal of the
conviction.
The defendant has not
established anything more than mere
speculation as to prejudice because of
ineffectiveness of his counsel.
Id. at page 3 of the opinion.
Respondent submits that in the case here,
appellant's guilt of the crime charged was proved beyond
a reasonable doubt.

There is no likelihood that even

had his trial counsel performed tests upon the truck and
introduced such evidence at trial the appellant would not
have been found guilty based upon the evidence presented
by the state and the fact that appellant did not seriously
dispute his involvement in the shooting.

This case

presents an example of the concern voiced by Justice
Crockett in State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P.2d
1313

(1974):

-15- provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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. . . we are impelled to remark
that it is nothing less than shameful
that our law seems to have degenerated
to a point where whenever an accused is
convicted of crime, the charge of
incompetency of counsel is, with ever
increasing frequency, leveled at capable
attorneys who have given entirely adequate
service, when the real difficulty was
that he had a guilty client.
517 P.2d 1313, 1315.
Based upon the foregoing argument, appellant
was given effective assistance of counsel at trial and
thus his conviction should be affirmed.
POINT III
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF HIS
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY.
Appellant alleges that the trial judge failed
to take proper measures to isolate the jury from possibly
prejudicial information.

During the trial, Frank Mitchell,

the victim of a crime for which appellant had previously
been tried entered the courtroom.

Judge Balli£ immediately

called a recess, and held a hearing in his chambers with
both counsel, appellant, and Mr. Mitchell present (T.ll3114).

In that hearing the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: And what is your
position, Mr. Mitchell? Why are -you
here? Did you realize the possibility
exists of any kind of disruption that
may occur with your presence here
because of the prior incident?
MR. MITCHELL: No, sir.
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THE COURT: It could cause a mistrial in this case.
MR. MITHCELL:
I didn't know that,
sir.
THE COURT: Apparently you hadn't
been advised of that fact, and that is
why I recessed proceedings in this
matter.
I would hope that you would
understand that, and I'm going to have
to ask you if you will leave for that
very reason.
HR. MITCHELL: Okay.
I just
thought the trial was open to the
public.
THE COURT: It is.
But this is a
matter where I know there are some very
hard feelings and some very serious
problems between the two sides here in
this matter, and we just don't want to
have any error committed in this trial.
I don't want to have to try it again.
I hope we have handled this in a way that
we have done it without any embarrassment
to you.
I hope, if you don't mind, that
you will leave.
MR. MITCHELL: Can I stay on this
floor?
THE COURT:
I think it would be
better if you weren't here right now.
I think we would all feel more comfortable
about the situation, and we would be able
to pay full attention to the matter of a
good legal, fair trial, if you would
leave the area here.
MR. MITCHELL: Okay.
THE COURT:
I appreciate that very
much.
Thank you.
(T.ll3-114).

Judge Ballif thus requested that Mr.

Mitchell leave the area, which he apparently did.
It should also be noted that Judge Ballif
was very careful to admonish the jury not to talk to
anyone else or between themselves about the case while
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the court was in recess.

He emphasized this necessity

at the start of the trial in light of the fact that
there was no jury room in the courthouse (T.l8,80,
112,160,221,238).
Appellant has failed to allege that there
was in fact any contact between Mr. Mitchell and any
of the jurors.

Allegations of possible contact do not

establish prejudicial, reversible error.

Nevertheless,

it is apparent from the record in this case that no
such contact did occur.

The following exchange occurred

just prior to Judge Ballif's instructing the jury:
MR. MUSSELMAN: I have one thing
further, your Honor. We would ask
that the Court informally, prior to,
or as a part of the instructions, ask or
encourage the jurors, in the event anyone
has tried to discuss the case with them
outside of the court, to bring that to the
attention of the Court.
I don't want to
imply that anyone has, but if they have,
we would like to be sure that they call
that to the Court's attention.
My reason for the request is that
after our discussion yesterday, Mr. Frank
Mitchell remained in the building down near
the snack bar-THE COURT: He was off this floor?
Wasn't that my order?
MR. MUSSELMAN: Was it just off this
floor?
THE COURT: I thought it was, yes.
HR. A!1BROSE: You told him to get out.
THE COURT: Well, I meant off this
floor.
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MR. MUSSELMAN:
I remember him
asking if he couldn't stay around this
floor, and the Court asked him to
leave, and probably the intent was just
to leave this floor.
THE COURT:
It was.
MR. MUSSELMAN:
I'm not saying
that he violated the Court's order.
I'm
just saying that in the event there was
any discussion, or any attempt to
influence the jurors on their way out,
and I don't want to tell them that in that
respect, but I would just request that the
Court, in a general manner, and if it can
sound like part of the instructions, encourage
the jurors to bring that to the Court's
attention, and that it is their duty if
anyone has tried to do that.
THE COURT: All right.
(The following proceedings are being
held in the courtroom with the jurors and
all court personnel being present. These
proceedings are starting at 9:45 a.m.)
THE COURT: Before the Court proceeds
with the reading of the Instructions to the
jury, I want to make a few comments. First
of all, I hope you understand that the
comments I make to you about out-of-court
communications would mean, and carry with
it the obligation on your part to convey to
the Court any attempt anyone would make to
influence you, or in any way comment about
the case to you out of the court. And I
assume that you would have done that,
had that occurred? That has not occurred,
as I understand it? All right. Fine.
Thank you very much.
(T.242-243).

The jurors were not in fact contacted or

approached by Mr. Mitchell or anyone else and thus were
not improperly influenced by outside sources.

Appellant

was not denied his right to trial by an impartial jury and
his conviction should be affirmed.
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CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the appellant has failed
to allege or prove any prejudicial error occurring at his
trial, as is shown in the foregoing argument and citation
of authorities.

Wherefore, respondent urges this Court

to affirm appellant's conviction and sentence.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General·
CRAIG L. BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent
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